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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER 
SERVICES, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 20000893-SC 
PSC Docket No. 99-057-20 
Priority 14 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES 
This is the Committee of Consumer Services' ("Committee") reply to the 
responses filed by the Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission") and Questar 
Gas Company ("Questar Gas/' "Company," or "utility") to the Committee's Opening 
Brief in this appellate proceeding. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Committee's appeal addresses the Commission's failure to analyze and make 
essential findings regarding Questar Gas' purported decisions and actions in resolving the 
coal seam gas problem, and the Commission's further disregard of critical facts in the 
record.1 In the alternative, this appeal addresses the Commission's error in not dismissing 
JThe Commission has the duty to make "appropriate findings of fact to justify rate 
orders." MCI Telecommunications v. PSC, 840 P.2d 765, 773 (Utah 1992). See also 
Milne Truck Lines Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986): 
Questar Gas' application for failure to sustain its burden of proof in light of the 
Commission's finding that it could not determine that the Company's decisions leading to 
the gas processing remedy were not influenced by affiliate interests. 
The Commission's response acknowledges the nature and prevalence of the 
affiliate interest and influence evidence disregarded in its August 11, 2000 Report and 
Order ("Order"). However, it still disregards the import of that evidence and further 
provides no justification for its failure to determine the nature or prudence of the 
purported gas processing decision or to hold the Company to its burden of proof. 
The Company's response argues that this appeal is a battle over evidence the 
Commission considered in its decision. It avoids the Committee's arguments that the 
Commission failed to analyze and make requisite findings, or in the alternative, to hold 
Questar Gas to its burden of proof. 
The Commission cannot discharge its statutory responsibilities without making 
findings of fact on all necessary ultimate issues under the governing statutory 
standards. It is also essential that the Commission make subsidiary 
findings in sufficient detail that the critical subordinate factual issues are 
highlighted and resolved in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is 
a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. The importance of 
complete, accurate, and consistent findings of fact is essential to a proper 
determination by an administrative agency. To that end, findings should be 
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual 
conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached. (Emphasis 
added, ed.). 
See also Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service Commission, 636 P.2d 
1047, 1058 (Utah 1981), where this Court held: "In administrative matters such as this, 
there must be findings on all material issues." 
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This Committee reply will first address the factual record in light of the 
Commission and Company responses and will then address each response. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE COMMISSION'S RESPONSE ACCEPTS THE 
COMMITTEE'S ACCOUNT OF THE RELEVANT 
FACTS IN THE RECORD 
The Committee's Opening Brief identifies several facts, completely disregarded in 
the Commission's analysis and findings,2 that identify the role Questar affiliate companies 
played in the management of Questar Gas, and the origin and resolution of the coal seam 
gas problem. They include the following: 
1. Questar Pipeline secured the business of transporting Price-area coal seam 
gas by means of 'future capacity' contracts in the early 1990s, whereunder 
the coal seam gas producers agreed to transport their gas on Questar 
Pipeline's system in exchange for a Questar Pipeline commitment to expand 
its system to accommodate the growing quantities of coal seam gas both 
parties anticipated would be produced in future years.3 
2. Questar Pipeline's transport of increasing quantities of Price-area coal seam 
gas conflicted with the interests and long-established gas supply 
requirements of Questar Gas and its ratepayers.4 
3. Questar Gas is managed and controlled by a Questar parent company 
management group that also manages and controls Questar Pipeline.5 
2Committee's Opening Brief, pages 14-17. 
3Ibid., footnote 56 on page 31, and the discussion on pages 30-34. 
4Ibid, pages 24-34. 
5
 Ibid, pages 17-20. 
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4. All analyses in the record relating to the coal seam gas problem and the 
1998 C02 Plant remedy were Questar parent company management group 
analyses that focused on Questar affiliate interests - not Questar ratepayer 
interests.6 
5. The "decision" to process the coal seam gas by means of a C02 Plant owned 
and operated by Questar Pipeline was a Questar parent company 
management group decision.7 
6. The "decision" that Questar Gas would procure gas processing services 
from Questar Pipeline's C02 Plant was a Questar parent company 
management group decision.8 
7. Questar Gas never responded to the coal seam gas problem. Questar 
Pipeline had always assumed the responsibility of remedying any harm its 
transport of coal seam gas created for utility customers.9 
These facts are recounted here because neither the Commission's nor the 
Company's response object to their inclusion in the Committee's Opening Brief. In fact, 
the Commission's response relies upon the Committee's Statement of the Case,10 and 
6Ibid, pages 20-22. Division witness Hanson testified that none of the analyses 
provided by the Company in response to discovery requests compared possible remedies 
"from the viewpoint of QGC and its customers. All were influenced by affiliate 
relationships." June 23, 1999 Rebuttal Testimony of Darrell S. Hanson, page 2. (Mr. 
Hanson's testimony is Addendum H to the Committee's Opening Brief.) 
7Committee's Opening Brief, pages 18-21. 
"Ibid 
9Ibid., pages 25-27. See also the undisputed Company testimony on this point. 
Page 5 of the February 1, 1999 Prepared Testimony and page 8 of the April 26, 1999 
Rebuttal Testimony of Company witness Alan K. Allred further describes the periodic 
remedies Questar Pipeline effected during the many years prior to 1998. The testimony of 
Mr. Allred is Addendum Nl to the Company's Response. 
^Commission's Response, page 4. 
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acknowledges a record "fraught" and "tinged" with "affiliate transactions or interests" 
and "conflicts of interest."11 
The Committee's Statement of Facts thus provides this Court an uncontradicted 
account "of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review/'12 including the critical 
facts disregarded by the Commission. This reply will frequently refer to those facts in the 
discussion that follows. 
II. THE COMMISSION NEVER ADDRESSES ITS FAILURE 
TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OR EXISTENCE OF 
THE COMPANY'S DECISION OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, ITS FAILURE TO DISMISS THE 
COMPANY'S APPLICATION FOR NOT SUSTAINING 
ITS BURDEN OF PROOF. 
A. The Commission's Inordinate Focus on the 'Result' 
The Commission's Response continues the rationale in its Order that burdens 
ratepayers with coal seam gas processing costs because of its finding that a utility 
"decision" "yielded the required result."13 In the words of its response argument, 
"[pjossible errors in utility decision making do not preclude recovery of costs incurred for 
a necessary and beneficial outcome."14 As is obvious from the phrasing of its argument, 
the Commission's response also continues its Order's inordinate focus on the 
1
 Commission's Response, bottom of page 8, and top of page 12. 
12Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24 Briefs, Section (7). 
^Commission's Order, page 35. 
^Commission's Response, page 6. 
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"outcome"or "result/5 to the neglect of the other foundational component in its rationale, 
the "decision" In fact, its response never bothers to further identify or discuss the nature 
or magnitude of the "possible errors"covered by its sweeping argument statement. Yet, 
the nature - certainly the existence - of a "decision" is critical to any finding of 
culpability or cost responsibility in this case. 
A fait accompli "required result" is often invoked in the service of interests other 
than those of the declared beneficiaries. While the continued safety of neighboring 
landowners may prompt the clean-up of an industrial spill, that does not prove the neigh-
boring landowners made the decision, nor is it dispositive of who should pay. Similarly, 
just because coal seam gas processing may protect utility ratepayers does not mean their 
representative made the decision, nor does it mean utility ratepayers should pay for it. 
The Commission's response argument phrase "[pjossible errors in utility decision 
making" pastes over much of the underlying controversy in this case; including the issue 
whether there even was any "utility decision making". According to Questar Gas' own 
testimony, the decision maker15 who decided coal seam gas processing was necessary was 
the same decision maker who in prior years decided other remedies were necessary to 
15As the Committee's Opening Brief makes clear, the 'decision maker' was the 
Questar parent company management group tasked with the responsibility of managing 
and controlling both Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline. See pages 9-10 and 17-20 of the 
Committee's Opening Brief. 
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protect utility customers from coal seam gas.16 However, the Company's testimony 
describes those earlier decisions as Questar Pipeline decisions that implemented remedies 
at Questar Pipeline's cost and burden. What then, given the same decision maker, the 
same problem, the same necessary purpose, and the same Questar Pipeline ownership and 
control of the remedy, was so different about the "hat"17 the decision maker wore the 
particular day it selected the gas processing remedy that made that one decision a 
'Questar Gas' decision and not the 'Questar Pipeline' decision it had always been before? 
What other than after-the-fact assertion and assumption?18 
Normally, in assigning cost recovery, a regulatory agency would examine not only 
the need for a course of action but also whether the analysis, selection, and other 
16February 1, 1999 Prepared Testimony of Alan K. Allred, Manager of Gas Supply 
Services for Questar Regulated Services Company, page 5. April 26, 1999 Rebuttal 
Testimony of Alan K. Allred, bottom of page 8. This testimony is included as Addendum 
Nl to the Company's Response. 
17The analogy of proxy authority to a 'hat' is derived from the admission by 
Questar Gas' principal parent company management group witness that the utility was 
under parent company management control; specifically the following exchange 
(Committee's Opening Brief, pages 18-19): 
Q So in some sense, you wear two hats on occasion? 
A I have job responsibilities that deal with both Questar Gas and 
Questar Pipeline, so in common parlance, I guess that could 
be sporting two hats . . . " 
18Even while acknowledging the Committee's and Division's position throughout 
both proceedings that the "decision" was not prudent (Order, pages 29 and 30), and the 
position of the Division, the Committee, and the Large Industrial Group that the decision 
was the result of the influence of affiliate interests (Order, pages 30 and 32), the 
Commission's Order never examines the purported Company decision. 
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"decision" steps to that end were reasonable and prudent. As the Committee's Opening 
Brief argues, given the affiliate concerns evident in this case, one would expect a rigorous 
examination of the 'utility' decision making steps by the Commission.19 Instead, it side-
steps that examination by posing a fictional either/or quandary: must it rule on the 
prudence of the "decision" or can it instead examine the "outcome?" 
[W]hether the contested C02 Stipulation resolves [this dispute] in a way that 
is reasonable and in the public interest... turns . . . on whether we must rule 
on the decision to enter the contract (whether prudent) or instead can examine 
the outcome of that decision (whether reasonable).20 
Treating its statement of the quandary as sufficient discussion and answer, the 
Commission proceeds with an 'outcome' analysis, disregarding enroute several critical 
facts in the record that disclose the nature of the decision it nevertheless makes the 
keystone of its conclusion to burden ratepayers with C02 Plant costs: 
Clearly QGC has the burden to demonstrate the decision to enter the contract 
is a prudent one. Parties differ as to whether it did so successfully. But 
whether or not QGC met this burden, we can and do conclude that its decision 
to procure gas processing has yielded the required result, that is, it effectively 
protected the safety of its customers. This means the costs of gas processing 
can be legitimately recovered in rates.21 
Unfortunately, and despite the undisputed factual record documenting the dual 
capacities and conflicting interests of the 'decision maker,' the Commission never 
19Committee's Opening Brief, pages 38-42. Affiliate interest and influence were 
constant subjects of witness testimony and concern from the very first day in both 
dockets. 
20/6/V/.,pagel6. 
21
 Ibid,, 
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discloses what bit of evidence enabled it to determine the "hat" the decision maker wore 
the day the "decision to procure gas processing" was made was a Questar Gas/Questar 
Gas ratepayers' hat and not a Questar Pipeline/Questar Corporation hat. It was certainly 
not looking at Division, Committee, or Industrial Group testimony concluding, in the 
words of the Manager of the Energy Section for the Division, that: 
In sum, after extensive review of information in this case and No. 98-057-12, 
the Division believes that . . . QGC's actions, or in-actions, appear to be 
influenced by affiliate relations more than the financial interests of its 
customers.22 
The Commission's use of the term "decision to procure gas processing" thus 
appears to be nothing more than mere window dressing in its Order, along with other 
words like "burden" and "clearly" and "prudent" and "demonstrate." When examined, its 
Order legitimizes rate recovery on the basis of a "necessary and beneficial outcome" 
alone. The Commission's Response essentially says as much. It never identifies or 
evaluates the "possible errors in utility decision making"it posits,23 be they errors in 
procedure or substance or Questar affiliates' evasion of established Questar Pipeline 
responsibilities. By analogy, even though the industrial company cleaned up its spill 
because it had a legal obligation to do so, the Commission would make neighboring 
landowners pay for the cleanup because it was beneficial for them. 
'Ibid, page 27. 
Commission's Response, page 6. 
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B. The Commission's Hypothetical 
The Commission's response poses a hypothetical set of circumstances 
"uncomplicated by affiliate transactions"24 to try and demonstrate the correctness of a 
decision based on a factual record "fraught" and "tinged" with affiliate transactions, 
interests, and influence.25 There are other uncomplicated facts in its hypothetical that 
limit its usefulness as well. For example, it posits the pipeline company's system could 
accommodate not only the initial quantities of high C02 content gas coming into 
production nearby, but also future increases in production. That, of course, is not so in 
this case, where the C02 Plant remedy was the direct result of increasing coal seam gas 
quantities flowing as a consequence of Questar Corporation's decisions to secure that 
business by expanding Questar Pipeline's system to accommodate those quantities.26 The 
Commission's hypothetical posits the pipeline company determined the need to process 
the high C02 content gas and contracted for gas processing services, whereas the 
Commission based its decision in this case on the supposed fact that Questar Gas 
determined the need to process the coal seam gas and contracted for gas processing 
services. The Commission's hypothetical also posits the pipeline company initiated a rate 
proceeding before the FERC to include gas processing costs in its customer rates. While 
Commission Chairman Mecham's Dissent, and considerable testimony in the record, 
24Commission's Response, page 6. 
25Ibid, pages 8 and 12. 
26Committee's Opening Brief, pages 30-34. 
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opine that is what should have happened,27 this case arose out of Questar Gas' application 
to the Commission to include coal seam gas processing costs in the rates it charges 
captive ratepayers for gas service. 
C. A Committee Hypothetical 
To better illustrate the importance of the facts the Commission's Order and 
Response disregard, the Committee would like to pose a hypothetical of its own - one 
very much complicated with affiliate interests and influence: 
Suppose the owner of a large company tasked a management group with the 
responsibility of managing two subsidiary companies. The management group's 
remuneration and further career opportunities depended upon the owner's satisfaction 
with how well the management group performed. 
The one managed subsidiary is a public utility with statutory interests and duties 
the other subsidiary - an interstate pipeline company - does not share. The pipeline 
company transports the utility's gas supply, but has business interests the utility does not 
share - most notably a profitable growing business transporting high C02 content gas. 
To secure that business, the pipeline company earlier agreed with the gas producers to 
expand its pipeline to accommodate the increasing quantities of high C02 content gas 
both parties anticipated would require transport in the future. 
Ibid., page 7. 
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The pipeline company and the owner recognized from the beginning the high C02 
content gas was incompatible with long-standing utility gas quality requirements. 
Because the pipeline company decided to transport the high C02 content gas in the same 
pipeline delivering the utility's gas supply, it made sure that transport did not harm the 
utility (or more importantly, the utility's customers) by periodically undertaking blending, 
back-hauling, and other remedial measures that kept the gas it delivered to the utility in 
compliance with the utility's established requirements. The pipeline's remedial measures 
were sufficient to cause the utility to take no action of its own to further protect its 
customers. 
When the management group took over management of the pipeline and utility, it 
made sure the pipeline company continued any necessary remedies to ensure that the 
utility's gas quality requirements were met. However, it became apparent that the 
growing quantities of the high C02 content gas the pipeline company was transporting 
would soon exceed the efficacy of the remedies employed in the past to protect the 
utility's gas supply. The management group had the utility implement a program to lower 
its long-standing gas quality requirements to accommodate lower BTU content gas. 
However, such a program should have been initiated years earlier if it were going to solve 
the impending problem because it would be unduly expensive for utility representatives to 
visit, on a crash program basis, all utility customers in the state and modify the orifices in 
their gas appliances to efficiently burn lower BTU value gas. Lowering the utility's gas 
quality requirements only made economic sense if it were accomplished over time by 
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making sure that the new gas appliances which utility customers purchased to replace 
their old ones were set by the manufacturer to efficiently burn lower BTU gas. Thus, 
there was still the need for a quick fix until the long-term remedy of changing gas 
customers' appliances could be completed. The management group decided the pipeline 
company would have to process the high C02 content gas to make it more compatible 
with the utility's gas quality requirements. Accordingly, it had the pipeline company 
construct and operate a C02 plant to process the gas. 
One troubling problem remained for the management group to solve. Remedying 
the harmful effects of the high C02 content gas on the utility's gas supply was a 
responsibility the pipeline company had assumed as a consequence of securing the 
business of transporting that gas, but the cost of this latest remedy would take a 
substantial bite out of the growing profits the management group wanted to demonstrate 
were a result of its management expertise. The management group eventually decided the 
owner's interests were best served if the gas processing costs were made a utility expense 
which could then be passed on to the utility's captive customers in the rates they pay for 
gas service. That arrangement not only resolved the problem in a way that protected the 
pipeline company's growing profits in gathering, storing, and transporting the high C02 
content gas; it further created a new revenue-generating $20 million capital asset for the 
pipeline company. Accordingly, the management group had the utility contract with the 
pipeline company for gas processing services, thereby turning the pipeline company's gas 
processing obligation into a service the utility would thereafter pay it to perform. The 
13 
management group then had the utility apply to its state public service commission to pass 
its contract costs on to captive ratepayers and provided management group testimony to 
support the utility argument that the C02 Plant remedy and gas services contract were 
actually utility decisions taken to protect the interests of the utility and its captive 
ratepayers. 
D. There Was no Prudent Utility Decision to Procure 
Gas Processing. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Committee's hypothetical is a much better 
model with which to consider the rightness or wrongness of the Commission's analysis 
and findings. It reflects the affiliate control and conflict of interests present in this case. 
It also more accurately reflects the nature of the decisions that were made, who made 
them, and why. 
Utility customers benefitted from coal seam gas processing, but protecting utility 
customers from the deleterious effects of coal seam gas was, and most essentially in this 
instance, an ongoing adjunct responsibility Questar Pipeline and Questar Corporation 
recognized and assumed when they secured the business of transporting increasing 
quantities of coal seam gas in the same pipeline that provided Questar Gas' gas supply. If 
Questar Pipeline had not assumed that responsibility in clearly identifiable ways in the 
preceding years leading up to 1998, then Questar Gas, for the better part of a decade, was 
recklessly inattentive to a growing serious harm to its customers.28 
28Committee's Opening Brief, footnote 54, page 29. 
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Either way, the purported decision in question does not support burdening 
ratepayers with C02 Plant costs. If it was a utility decision then, as a first response, it was 
woefully late and needlessly costly; and ratepayers should not be responsible for costs 
resulting from such neglect. If, on the other hand, it was a Questar Pipeline decision 
taken in furtherance of previously assumed Questar Pipeline responsibilities, the resulting 
costs are a Questar Pipeline responsibility, not a utility ratepayer responsibility. 
E. If the Commission Could not Determine the Nature of 
the Decision, it Should Have Dismissed the Company's 
Application. 
It goes without saying that ratepayers are not responsible simply because the gas 
processing remedy was more expensive or because they are captive customers of a utility 
monopoly and have no alternative for gas service. If the Commission could not determine 
which "hat" the decision maker wore because the Company did not meet its burden of 
proving the decisions in question were not influenced by affiliate interests, it was under a 
duty to dismiss the Company's application.29 Given the factual record, its finding of a 
necessary and beneficial result is woefully short of the findings necessary to support 
assigning gas processing costs to ratepayers in this case. 
F. Reply to Specific Statements in the Commission's 
Response 
Statement 1: Whether the process of deciding to build and building the C02 
processing plant was or was not improperly influenced by 
affiliate interests, does not avoid the fact that processing Coal 
29Ibid., pages 42-44. 
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Seam gas was the only viable alternative permitting Questar Gas 
to continue to provide safe natural gas utility service to all its 
customers/0 
Reply: The C02 Plant may have been the only viable alternative in the artificial 
time and fact vacuum the Commission created by disregarding facts that showed the long 
historical development of the problem. There were clearly other alternative solutions 
available over that longer developmental time span. For openers, as Commission 
Chairman Mecham observed, but for Questar Corporation's ownership of Questar Gas, 
one would have expected Quester Gas to "raise all sorts of Cain" upon learning that its 
pipeline gas supplier intended to start transporting gas that was incompatible with its 
customers' requirements.31 More importantly, however, remedying the coal seam gas 
problem had always been a Questar Pipeline responsibility?2 A prudent independent 
utility would have arguably taken steps to resolve the problem much earlier than 1998 had 
it determined its pipeline supplier was not adequately addressing the problem. Even if the 
C02 processing plant was "the only viable alternative" in 1998, it was a remedy Questar 
Pipeline - not Questar Gas - determined, controlled, and should pay for. 
30Ibid. 
31Committee's Opening Brief, footnote 54, on page 29. 
32Committee's Opening Brief, top of page 12. See also the testimony of the 
Company's principal witness regarding the various remedies Questar Pipeline undertook 
during the many years prior to 1998 to remedy the coal seam gas problem its pipeline 
transport business created. February 1, 1999 Prepared Testimony of Alan K. Allred, 
Manager of Gas Supply Services for Questar Regulated Services Company, page 5. April 
26, 1999 Rebuttal Testimony of Alan K. Allred, bottom of page 8. This testimony of Mr. 
Allred is included as Addendum Nl to the Company's Response. 
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Statement 2: No party contradicted Questar Gas evidence that, if Questar 
companies had not done so, other companies or the gas 
producers themselves would have constructed intermediate 
pipeline facilities which would then have brought the higher 
C02 content gas to the Questar interstate pipeline.33 
Reply: While this statement may be true, it misses the essential fact. The 
quantities of coal seam gas that could have been accommodated in Questar Pipeline's 
system under those circumstances would never have produced the customer safety crisis 
that occurred in 1998.34 
Statement 3: Processing to remove C02 was not necessary for any interstate 
market purposes; it was needed only to meet Questar Gas' 
uniquely high BTU and C02 content standards.35 
Reply: Questar Gas is far and away Questar Pipeline's largest customer, 
controlling well over fifty percent of its reserve pipeline capacity. Whether or not its gas 
requirements were unique, they were long-standing requirements going back to the time 
when Questar Pipeline was an adjunct department within the public utility and its pipeline 
system was built for the purpose of transporting gas to the utility's distribution system.36 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Questar Pipeline's obligation to deliver gas 
Commission's Response, page 9. 
34Committee's Opening Brief, pages 30-34. 
35Commission's Response, page 10. 
36Questar Gas' principal witness testified that the utility's gas BTU content 
requirement had been established "[fjor as far back as anybody working in the company 
can remember, or as far back as any records we could find." See footnote 16 on page 9 of 
the Committee's Opening Brief. 
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meeting Questar Gas' long-established requirements changed after Questar Pipeline 
began transporting Price-area coal seam gas. Quite the opposite; the record shows that 
after Questar Pipeline began transporting the incompatible coal seam gas, it continued to 
consider it a Questar Pipeline obligation to meet Questar Gas5 established gas quality 
requirements by implementing periodic remedies in order to meet that obligation.37 
Statement 4: From the Commission's view and determination, although it 
could not predict exactly what the FERC result would have 
been, the more persuasive evidence was that some cost 
responsibility would be assigned to Questar Gas, rather than no 
cost responsibility whatsoever . . . Based upon the record 
evidence, the Commission's acceptance of the [C02 Stipulation] 
represents an approximation of the likely cost recovery outcome 
that would have been required from Questar Gas and its 
customers for the benefits obtained from the only operational 
alternative that allowed continued, safe provision of service to 
all of Questear Gas' customers.38 
Reply. There are several problems with this statement and the reasoning in the 
Commission's Order it refers to. Instead of looking to evidence in the record bearing 
upon the Company's entitlement to less than full recovery, the Commission considered 
what might have happened had a federal regulatory body (operating under different law, 
different factual circumstances, and with different parties and different arguments before 
it) resolved a Questar Pipeline petition to include the gas processing costs in question in 
the rates it charges pipeline customers. 
See footnote 32, above, and the discussion to which it relates. 
'Commission's Response, page 14. 
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The Questar parent company management group could have easily brought a 
Questar Pipeline action before the FERC, as Commission Chairman Mecham concluded 
they should have done years earlier.39 They decided instead to effect their own remedy 
and cost allocation in a way, one must assume, that best reflected Questar affiliate 
pecuniary interests. They decided Questar Pipeline would own and operate the C02 
processing plant but Questar Gas captive ratepayers would pay for it. They then had 
Questar Gas initiate these proceedings before the Commission. Having done so, the 
Questar management group invoked a proceeding where the decision would necessarily 
be based on Utah statutory law, administrative regulations, and case precedent. If Questar 
Pipeline ever brings an action before the FERC to include coal seam gas processing costs 
in the rates it charges its pipeline customers, so be it. That, however, is not the case 
before the Commission and should not be the basis for assigning cost recovery in this 
case. 
Finally, if assigning C02 Plant costs to Questar ratepayers is illegitimate in the first 
place,40 a compromise settlement (the C02 Stipulation the Commission accepted) that 
restricts rate recovery to something less than all costs is no less illegitimate and wrong. 
As the Opening Brief of Intervenors Crossroads Urban Center and Salt Lake Community 
Action Program effectively argues, the Commission has no authority to accept a 
39Committee's Opening Brief, page 11, footnote 11. 
40The Commission determined that such costs could be "legitimately recovered in 
rates" based on the erroneous assumption that those costs were the result of a Questar Gas 
"decision." See Commission statement quoted in Committee's Opening Brief, page 16. 
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stipulated settlement in lieu of performing its statutory mandate of finding rate increases 
to be just and reasonable.41 
III. THE COMPANY AVOIDS ADDRESSING THE LEGAL BASES 
OF THE COMMITTEE'S APPEAL. 
As noted in the Introduction above, the Company's response attempts to recast the 
Committee's appeal into a "substantial evidence" test under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(g). In so doing, it not only disregards the bases for appeal stated after each of the 
eight issues in the Committee's Statement of the Issues on Review but virtually all of the 
substance in the Committee's argument as well. The Committee believes the legal bases 
for its appeal are sufficiently and clearly set forth in its Opening Brief and otherwise 
addressed in its above reply to the Commission's response. Space will not allow a further 
reply to the Company's substantial evidence argument here. 
A. Company's Assertions of Questar Decisions are 
Contradicted by the Record. 
The Committee would here note that the Company avoids any discussion of the 
Commission's disregard of facts and failure to determine the nature and prudence of the 
Company's decision to procure gas processing by indulging in the same ruse or 
assumption manifest in the Commission's Order. It simply asserts that Questar "studied a 
variety of alternative possibilities/'42 "adopted what was in its judgment the more 
41Opening Brief of Intervenors Crossroads Urban Center and Salt Lake 
Community Action Program, pages 8-9. 
42Company's Response, page 11. 
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practical, cheaper, and far less uncertain solution to the problem,"43 and "[t]o implement 
this result. . . entered into a gas-processing agreement... with a Questar affiliate."44 As 
discussed above, such assertions contradict the factual record and cloak the evident issue 
raised by that record; namely, whether the controlling Questar management group's 
actions and decisions were taken on behalf of Questar Gas and its ratepayers or Questar 
Pipeline and Questar Corporation. 
B. Reply to Specific Statements in the Company's Response 
Statement 1: For purposes of this case, Questar agrees that the Commission 
cannot impose utility costs on ratepayers that were imprudently 
incurred. Not even the Committee has made the claim that the 
costs at issue were imprudently incurred.45 
Reply: The Committee and Company at least both agree that the Commission 
cannot impose utility costs on ratepayers that were imprudently incurred. However, 
contrary to the Company's second sentence, the Committee does claim that the costs at 
issue were imprudently incurred.46 
Statement 2: [T]he Committee's argument claims that the contract for 
services from the C02 plant violates the Commission's policies 
"Ibid. 
44
 Ibid., bottom of page 11. 
45Company's Response, page 4. 
46The imprudence of the costs and decision has been a consistent Committee 
position throughout both proceedings and on appeal. See, for example, the Commission's 
own view of the Committee's position on page 29 of its Order, and the Committee's 
Opening Brief, page 45. 
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and the Court's interpretation of those policies . . . [This] issue 
was not preserved for appeal by the Committee.47 
Reply: In a discussion faulting the Commission's "outcome" analysis, the 
Committee's Petition for Reconsideration quotes the Commission's own statement from 
its Order that, "[t]he most troubling question is whether the contract between QGC and its 
unregulated affiliate, QTS, was prudently entered." Given the Commission's standards 
and policies regarding affiliate transactions enunciated in such places as its 1984 order 
conditionally approving Questar Corporation's ownership of the public utility, the 
Commission's statement clearly invokes those standards and the resulting issue of 
whether they were violated in the case of the gas processing services contract. 
Statement 3: The object of [the Committee's] suggestions is that the 
Commission did not explicitly declare the C02 processing 
agreement to have unequivocally been prudently entered into. 
But, this was an ancillary issue which, under the circumstances, 
did not require a direct answer.48 
Reply: How so ancillary, and how so not require a direct answer? Even the 
Commission's Order declares that "[c]learly QGC has the burden to demonstrate the 
decision to enter the contract is a prudent one" (emphasis added, ed.).49 Yet an 
examination of its analysis and findings discloses that the Commission studiously avoided 
any analysis of the decision - even its existence. 
47Company's Response, page 33. 
48Company's Response, page 17. 
49August 11, 2000, Report and Order, page 35. This Commission statement 
appears in context on page 16 of the Committee's Opening Brief. 
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Statement 4: Did the Commission 'abuse its discretion,' as delegated to it by 
the Legislature? Although there is some loose use of this 
phrase, Petitioners make no such direct claim or cite interpretive 
case law on the point. Oblique claims of abuse of discretion 
here are nothing more than Petitioners' dissatisfaction with the 
outcome.50 
Reply: Abuse of discretion is a stated basis of appeal for five of the eight Issues 
on Review in the Committee's Opening Brief. It is, as the Company's response states, a 
basis specifically provided for in the law.51 Underlying those enumerated instances of 
Commission abuse of administrative discretion is the Commission's further disregard of 
undisputed factual evidence in the record which bears directly on the identified issues. 
The responses of the Commission and Company both cite the case of US West 
Communications v. Public Service Commission, 901 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah 1995), holding 
that "the Commission's unexplained disregard of credible, uncontradicted evidence . . . 
was arbitrary and capricious and therefore warrants reversal." A further decision of this 
Court, cited in the US West case and in the Company's response, holds that "the law does 
not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard 
uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence."52 Disregard by the Commission of 
uncontradicted, competent evidence is exactly what happened in these proceedings. 
Company's Response, page 19. 
51Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). 
52Jones et al v. California Packing Corp. et al, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah 1952). 
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While in those cases characterized as arbitrary and capricious, such Commission action is 
inherently also an abuse of administrative discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's Order approving the C02 Stipulation settlement never analyzed 
or determined the nature - or even the existence - of the purported utility "decision" it 
nevertheless cites as a basis for legitimizing Questar Gas' rate recovery of coal seam gas 
processing costs. It failed to make any such findings despite extensive evidence in the 
record disclosing who made the purported decision and why - evidence which the 
structure of analysis and findings in the Commission's Order show were completely 
disregarded by the Commission. That disregarded evidence shows beyond question that 
there was no utility decision to procure gas processing. Correcting the harm to Questar 
Gas' gas supply caused by Questar Pipeline's transport of Price-area coal seam gas was 
always a Questar Pipeline responsibility; and the Questar parent company management 
group decision to implement gas processing was therefore either a Questar Pipeline 
decision, taken in furtherance of previously established Questar Pipeline responsibilities, 
or a very untimely (late) and imprudent utility decision. In either case, it is not a decision 
that supports rate recovery of gas processing costs. 
In the alternative, and to the extent the Commission did not address the nature and 
existence of the decisions in question because the Company failed to prove affiliate 
interests did not influence those decisions, the Commission had the legal duty to dismiss 
the Company's application for failure to meet its burden of proof. 
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In either alternative, the Commission's Order demonstrates reversible error and 
abuse of discretion in allowing coal seam gas processing costs into rates. The Committee 
petitions this Court to reverse ab initio the Commission's decision allowing C02 gas 
processing costs into rates in Docket Nos. 99-057-20, 98-057-12, and 01-057-14 - all 
three dockets having been consolidated in this appeal - and return this case to the 
Commission for implementation of this Court's reversal. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of March, 
*W\ 
RESP T. WARNICK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for The Committee of Consumer 
Services 
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